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The U.S. Product Liability System: A Competitive Advantage
to Foreign Manufacturers
Randolph J. Stayin*
During the past decade, U.S. manufacturers have complained repeat-
edly about the competitive advantage enjoyed by their foreign compet-
itors as a result of the U.S. product liability system. In 1984, I completed
a study for the U.S. Department of Commerce 1 which included findings
that confirmed the competitive advantage. Differences between the U.S.
product liability system and the product liability systems of the Western
European countries and Japan result in higher product liability costs to
U.S. manufacturers that are necessarily included in determining the unit
price of U.S. machinery. This not only increases the cost of U.S. made
products, but the fear of product liability has had a chilling effect on
product development, innovation, experimentation and manufacture.
The U.S. product liability system is causing U.S. made products to be
less competitive in price and may ultimately cause U.S. made products to
be less competitive technologically.
I. THE WORKPLACE PRODUCT LIABILITY PROBLEM
IN THE UNITED STATES
The workplace product liability problem in the United States is ex-
acerbated by the interaction of product liability and state workers com-
pensation laws. Under present law, almost all state worker's
compensation statutes (or their court interpretation) bar recovery of in-
demnification from the employer by a workplace product manufacturer,
no matter how negligent the employer may have been in failing to prop-
erly guard and maintain that product or in making the product unsafe as
a result of altering and modifying the product or in failing to instruct and
monitor employees on how to use it. This inequity is further com-
pounded by the fact that, in most jurisdictions, the employer or the
worker's compensation insurance carrier obtains a subrogation lien on
third party recoveries even though the employer may have caused or con-
tributed to the cause of the employee's injury. The Insurance Services
* Member of the firm of Barnes & Thornburg, Washington, D.C.
1 INT'L TRADE ADMIN., OFF. OF TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF COM.,
INTERNATIONAL STUDY OF PRODUCT LIABILITY COSTS AND SYSTEMS FOR FIVE DOMESTIC MA-
CHINERY INDUSTRIES (Nov. 1, 1984) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL STUDY]. This study includes a
review of the product liability systems in Japan, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
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Office ("ISO") Study reveals that about fifty-six percent of workplace
product liability bodily injury payments involve cases where the defend-
ant manufacturer would have impleaded the employer based on fault but
for the worker's compensation exclusivity rule. Thus, manufacturers of
workplace products are, in effect, paying the entire cost of many indus-
trial accidents, while employer-users of the products may be completely
relieved of financial responsibility despite the fact that they may have
been in a better position (or in the only position) to prevent the accident
from occurring.
The worker's compensation shield decreases an employer's incentive
to acquire safer machinery and generally to provide a safe workplace.
Some incentive remains since worker's compensation costs will go down
where there are fewer injuries. However, this is offset by the subrogation
recovery from the employee's product liability award. Even if the em-
ployer is at fault in causing or contributing to the cause of the employee's
injury, he may still recover through his subrogation lien all payments
made pursuant to the employee's worker's compensation claim. Product
related subrogation recoveries amounted to $40.2 million in 1981.
The incentives, therefore, do not reflect the fact that it is generally
the employer who is knowledgeable about and dictates the product use or
misuse, transmits the instructions and warnings, controls the environ-
ment in which the product is used, and frequently alters the machinery.
This system provides an incentive to the employer to encourage an in-
jured employee to bring a product liability suit against a machinery man-
ufacturer so that even the limited financial exposure by the employer can
be passed on through subrogation. "Thus, both employees' expectations
of a safe workplace and manufacturers' expectations that products will
be used safely in the workplace may be frustrated by an employer's lack
of incentive to insure that a product is used in a safe manner."' 2 The
system places the primary incentive for workplace safety on the wrong
party and works in opposition to the injury prevention policy of product
liability law.
II. PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
During the period of 1984-86, the premiums in the entire insurance
market turned upward, especially in the product liability line. Reinsur-
ers made dramatic increases in rates to insurance companies due to large
losses that they had incurred. This, in turn, imposed an additional pres-
sure on primary insurers to increase their rates. During the summer of
1984, members of the Woodworking Machinery Distributors Association
("WMDA") received increases of 500% to 1,000% with only 5 days no-
tice prior to expiration of their policies. Members of the Food Processing
Machinery and Supplies Association, the Machinery Dealers National
2 Carpenter, Product Liability - An Analysis of The Law Concerning Design And Warning
Defects In Workplace Products, 33 S.C.L. REV. 273, 278 (1981).
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Association, and the Process Equipment Manufacturers Association ex-
perienced up to 500% increases; the Packaging Machinery Manufactur-
ers Institute members experienced up to 700% increases. Further
substantial increases occurred in 1985 and 1986, regardless of each com-
pany's loss experience and the risk of the particular product involved.
For example, it is estimated that the members of the Machinery Dealers
National Association experienced 1000% to 1500% increases since 1984.
When coupled with larger deductibles, less coverage, and forced shifts
from occurrence to claims-made policies, the cost of product liability in-
surance for that group increased as much as thirty times.
The results of the National Machine Tool Builders' Association An-
nual Product Liability Survey (dated February 2, 1987, and based on 92
returns) indicated that 23% of its members had no product liability in-
surance and that for those fortunate enough to find coverage, insurance
premiums had risen by 55% since 1986 and had tripled since 1985. 1986
levels exceeded the peak of the mid-1970s insurance crisis; 1987 was even
worse with premiums continuing to rise and the number of companies
"going bare" exceeding the 1979 levels. The average premium was
$235,700 (up 55% from $151,900 in 1986 and up 299% from $59,100 in
1985). Thirty-four percent had to accept large deductibles or self-reten-
tions averaging $81,900. One respondent in four had no insurance at all
(mostly because they found their carriers' proposals to be too expensive,
although some could not even get a proposal); 43% of those companies
with annual sales in excess of $2.5 million had no umbrella policy to
protect against catastrophic claims.
Companies in the industries studied experienced a product liability
insurance crisis at least as severe as that of the 1970s. In the last three
years this problem has been manifested in severe rate increases, policy
restrictions, and cancellations of product liability coverage.
III. PRODUCT LIABILITY SYSTEMS IN EUROPE AND JAPAN
The International Study found that, although a product liability ac-
tion may be brought in Europe and Japan against a manufacturer of
workplace machinery, such actions are virtually nonexistent. This sharp
contrast to the United States is primarily due to an approach to work-
place product liability in these countries that is quite different from that
in the United States. A worker injured in the countries studied is com-
pensated by worker's compensation, a social security system or the em-
ployee's company. An injured employee typically believes that full
compensation has been made as a result of receiving social security or
worker's compensation payments and thus does not seriously consider
pursuing the manufacturer of the machine which caused the injury.
Moreover, those countries rely primarily on the employer for workplace
safety.
If the injured employee did pursue the available product liability
3
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remedies, the employee could only hope for compensation for pain and
suffering since foreign courts consider worker's compensation or social
security payments as full compensation for all other damages. Although
the concept of pain and suffering and the flexibility accorded U.S. juries
in this respect contributes to high product liability awards in the United
States, pain and suffering have gained much more limited recognition in
the foreign countries studied. Awards for pain and suffering in some Eu-
ropean countries are specifically limited by statute. Moreover, the
Europeans seem to place a lower value on intangible, general damages
like pain and suffering. Punitive damages are not available in these for-
eign jurisdictions and, therefore, the plaintiff does not have the windfall
potentially available to the U.S. litigant. Therefore, damage awards and
settlement costs are much lower than in the United States. These costs
contribute to the substantial difference in premiums between U.S. and
European insurance coverage.
The use of juries in civil trials is virtually unknown in Europe and
Japan. Among Western European countries, the jury system operates in
civil cases only in Ireland, where it has been found that, on average, dam-
ages awarded are four to six times higher than in England (where dam-
ages are awarded by judges). This is despite the fact that England has a
considerably higher standard of living.' Unlike in the United States, the
product manufacturer does not face the prospect of a jury award which is
enhanced by sympathy to injured plaintiffs and affected by the "deep
pocket" syndrome, both of which contribute to high damage awards and
inconsistent verdicts in the United States. The use of judges to determine
liability and damages diminishes the potential of emotional decisions and
extraordinary damage awards.
There are further disincentives in the European and Japanese sys-
tems that discourage injured parties from pursuing a product liability
action against a manufacturer. Unlike in the United States, contingent
fees for lawyers are illegal. Under the U.S. contingent fee system, plain-
tiffs do not pay fees to their attorneys unless they are successful in the
lawsuit, and then only out of the proceeds collected. In the foreign coun-
tries studied, the plaintiffs will not only be required to pay for their own
attorney's fees, but if the plaintiff loses the product liability action, the
legal fees and court costs of the defendant may also be paid by the plain-
tiff. Foreign plaintiffs' attorneys are not motivated by the prospect of
receiving one-third or more of large compensatory and punitive damage
awards. Technical expertise and specialization in product liability which
is so prevalent among American plaintiffs' lawyers is not developed in
Europe and Japan. Thus, it is much more difficult for European and
Japanese lawyers to maintain successful product liability actions, espe-
cially in cases involving the very technical elements of design defect.
Lawyers in these foreign countries keep a lower profile, are forbidden to
3 I understand that Ireland is currently planning to abolish its jury system in civil cases.
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advertise and have much less public exposure than U.S. product liability
attorneys. Pre-trial discovery in the investigated foreign countries is
much more limited than in the United States and class action suits are
not allowed. Product safety, accident, and defect data that is widely
available in the United States is much more difficult to obtain in foreign
countries. In contrast to the United States, the prospect of bringing a
product liability action involves a weighing of the financial risk to the
plaintiff against lower damage awards and the difficulty of developing
and winning the case. All of these factors create substantial disincentives
for an injured party to bring a product liability action.
In addition, there is also the overriding predisposition among
Europeans and Japanese against litigation, a phenomenon in stark con-
trast to the high level of litigation consciousness among the American
population. The "deep pocket" expectation does not exist in these coun-
tries. In Japan, the injured worker would consider it improper to at-
tempt to hold others responsible for his/her injury. Bringing a lawsuit
would cause further "loss of face."
While the member countries of the European Community are in the
process of implementing its product liability directive by July 1988, this
substantive change will not alter the major systemic differences outlined
above.4 No contingent fees for lawyers, no jury decisions on liability and
damages, the cost to plaintiff of attorney's fees and those of the defendant
if the plaintiff loses, low damage awards for pain and suffering, no oppor-
tunity for punitive damages, and the other limitations listed above will
continue to act as disincentives to litigation in the European Community.
"Imposition of liability without fault for the production of defective
products in the absence of a total reorganization of European judicial
operations will probably have little impact on the costs borne by
industry."5
IV. DIFFERENCES IN PRODUCT LIABILITY COSTS
Due to these systemic disincentives and reluctance to litigate, the
product liability remedies for workplace injuries exist in theory, but are
not pursued. For all of these reasons, the International Study found that
foreign competitors of U.S. machinery manufacturers have product
liability insurance costs 20 to 100 times lower than those of their U.S.
competitors in their respective home markets and do not have the burden
of all of the other product liability related costs incurred by U.S.
manufacturers.
In addition to the high cost of product liability insurance, U.S. man-
ufacturers also incur other costs related to product liability claims, such
as: deductible sums under the insurance policy; awards above the policy
4 See Leibman, The European Community's Products Liability Directive: Is the U.S. Experience
Applicable?, 18 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 795 (1986).
5 Id. at 814.
5
Stayin: The U.S. Product Liability System: A Competitive Advantage to For
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1988
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
limits; time and costs of company personnel spent in accident investiga-
tions, document assembly and production, interrogatory responses, court
testimony, etc. During our visits to manufacturing plants in the United
States, we were impressed by the amount of effort and degree of care
expended by manufacturers in order to assure the safety of their prod-
ucts. In addition to those costs, however, they incur further continuous
costs for preventative measures to reduce product liability exposure.
Questionnaire responses received from U.S. companies in the subject in-
dustries reveal that these risk prevention costs, exclusive of product lia-
bility insurance, range from $5,000 to $80,000 per year. Other industries
have experienced similar costs. One machine tool manufacturer reported
that his product liability costs per machine increased from $200 per
machine in 1970 to $11,000 per machine in 1982. In 1981, that manufac-
turer's product liability insurance costs were 3.1% of sales.6 The Sport-
ing Goods Manufacturers Association has indicated that its members'
product liability costs in 1982 amounted to 4.2% of sales compared to
0.5% of sales for its Japanese competitors.7
A spokesman for the National Machine Tool Builders Association,
whose members have experienced import penetration of the U.S. market
in excess of 40%, made the following observation:
Part of the foreign machine tool manufacturer's cost is product
liability insurance. As with any other cost, it is factored into the price
of their respective products. Because the United States is only a partial
market for them, their product liability costs are substantially less than
those of domestic machine tool manufacturers. We still sell the bulk of
our products here and must face exposure to product liability with re-
spect to a substantial number of our products....
Perhaps more importantly, our product liability insurance costs
are affected by our older products. Under product liability law today
in the majority of states, we are potentially responsible literally "for
ever" for products .... While we usually win these [overage product
liability] suits, they result in high legal and transaction costs.... For-
eign machine tool manufacturers, on the other hand, do not have these
older products in this country. Therefore their product liability insur-
ance costs often are substantially less than ours. With total instability
in our law with regard to older products, we, in effect, have a major
stumbling cost block with foreign competition.8
The majority of sales by the manufacturers in the subject industries
are made to customers located within the United States. This is because
6 Testimony of Herbert W. Goetz, Product Safety Manager of Cincinnati, Inc. before the Sub-
committee on the Consumer, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation (Mar.
12, 1982).
7 See letter from Howard J. Brunz, President, Sporting Goods Manufacturers Association, to
the President of the United States 1 (Apr. 23, 1982).
8 Letter from James H. Mack, Public Affairs Director, National Machine Tool Builders Asso-
ciation, to Jim J. Tozzi, Deputy Director of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, (June 10, 1982).
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of their dominance over the past 100 years of the U.S. market, the size of
the U.S. market, and difficulties inherent in exporting. Generally speak-
ing, U.S. manufacturers dominated the domestic capital goods market
until the last ten years. They then began to experience a severe erosion in
market share brought on by foreign competitors that had begun to catch
up for a number of reasons, including technological advances and price
competition.
While foreign manufacturers have achieved substantial penetration
of the U.S. market in recent years, the volume of their products in the
U.S. market is far less than in their own domestic markets and the world
market generally. Therefore, the foreign manufacturers do not have the
high level of exposure, as a percentage of sales, to U.S. product liability
that their U.S. competitors must bear.
Furthermore, U.S. manufacturers are plagued by the long tail of po-
tential liability that accompanies machines that were sold and have been
operating in the United States for fifty years or more. Primary concerns
expressed by manufacturers in the studied U.S. industries related to
product liability experiences with these older products and to the fear of
unending future liability for these products. These older products do not
benefit from more recently developed safety devices and, in fact, were
built at a time when the manufacturers had never even heard of the con-
cept of product liability or the accompanying emphasis on "human fac-
tors engineering." These machines have often passed through many
different users and have been modified or altered by the different owners
to suit their purposes. These problems are compounded by the difficulty
in locating these older machines and the resistance of their owners to pay
for, or accept, costly safety improvements.
In contrast, there are very few older products of foreign origin in the
United States. The newer, foreign products have been engineered with
modern safety features and, therefore, are much less likely to cause an
injury. The newer product is more likely to still be in use by the original
purchaser and, therefore, easier to locate for purposes of recommending
safety improvements. As a result of these factors, the foreign manufac-
turer faces fewer lawsuits, lower product liability overhead, and lower
product liability insurance costs for those products sold in the United
States.
The U.S. manufacturer incurs the higher cost of U.S. product liabil-
ity for a higher percentage of its products, thus increasing the total unit
cost for U.S. machines as compared to foreign machines. The unending
exposure for older machinery further increases this overhead burden as
compared to the foreign manufacturers. Insurers establish product liabil-
ity rates on an individual company and product basis, looking closely at
loss history and the breadth of potential exposure. The number of prod-
ucts that are exposed to product liability in the United States and pro-
spective liability for overage products will result in a higher product
liability insurance rate than that which would be charged to foreign man-
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ufacturers for the products they are selling in the United States. While
foreign manufacturers will have one product liability insurance rate for
the United States (and possibly Canada) and another for the rest of the
world, even the coverage for the U.S. sales will cost less in comparison to
that of their U.S. competitors. The rate will be lower due to the lower
risk of their new machines and the absence of the long tail of liability.
The overall premium will be less due to the lower volume of sales in the
U.S. market. Finally, the U.S. rate can be averaged in with the lower
overhead created by the "other than United States" rate, thus allowing
the foreign manufacturer even more flexibility in pricing its units sold in
the United States.
Many of the U.S. companies interviewed did not purchase separate
policies for U.S. coverage and for foreign coverage and thus did not expe-
rience a reduction in premium to reflect sales to the export market. Some
U.S. companies had purchased separate coverage for exports at a lower
rate than for the U.S. coverage. However, even those companies that
separately insure higher for foreign coverage incur insurance costs
abroad than their foreign competitors. This is due to the fact that even
where an injury occurred abroad, there is always a possibility of being
sued in the United States.9
A growing concern to U.S. manufacturers is their exposure to prod-
uct liability suits in the United States brought by foreign parties where
the injury and purchase of the product occurred in a foreign country.
There is an obvious advantage to bringing the case in the United States:
the possibility that the U.S. product liability system may be applied (sub-
stantive and procedural) which will result in much higher damage
awards (compensatory and punitive) with free legal service through a
contingency fee arrangement. This, in turn, raises the settlement value of
the claim. A commentator who studied the developments in the Bhopal
case has estimated that the total award against Union Carbide would be
less than $73 million if the case is heard in India, while a U.S. trial could
result in compensatory damages as high as $235 million, plus potential
punitive damages as high as ten times that amount, limited only by the
net worth of Union Carbide.1° The prospect of such damages led Union
Carbide to offer a settlement of $350 million and "the opportunity for
punitive damages ... probably led [the plaintiffs] to reject the offer.""1
On April 4, 1988, an Indian appeals court judge ordered Union Carbide
to pay damages of $193 million within the next two months. 12
9 Address by Frank A. Orbin, III, International Counsel, Armstrong World Industries, Na-
tional Legal Center for the Public Interest, Product Liability Seminar 3-5 (Apr. 21, 1982).
10 Besharov, Whose Law Should Apply For Foreign Torts?, NAT'L L.J. 30 (July 20, 1987).
11 Id.
12 Union Carbide Ordered to Pay $193 Million, Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 1988, at 12. High Court
Justice S.K. Seth reduced the lower court's order of $270 million for interim relief, found that more
than a prima facie case had been made, and ordered the $193 million as damages, not just interim
relief.
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While most such cases filed in U.S. courts are dismissed based on
the doctrine of inconvenient forum, some have succeeded. In Corrigan v.
Shiley Corp., the California Supreme Court ruled in favor of trial in
California of a wrongful death claim, even though the deceased and
plaintiffs were Australian citizens, the surgery was performed in an Aus-
tralian hospital by Australian doctors, and there was evidence of possible
negligence of the Australian hospital and doctors. Among the considera-
tions noted by the Court were: California's interest in regulating the for-
eign marketing of defective products (the allegedly defective heart valve
prosthesis manufactured by the defendant); weight given to plaintiff's
choice of forum; and the disadvantage manifest in removal to Australia
which does not entertain substantive products liability law similar to that
of California. It was decided that the case would be tried in California
under its strict liability law. "The lesson to American firms doing busi-
ness in other countries is clear: assume that American levels of liability
can be imposed on goods and services sold abroad - and act accord-
ingly." 14 This lesson has been learned and reflected in the higher insur-
ance cost for U.S. products, even when sold and used in other countries.
As U.S. companies are paying the high cost of U.S. product liability
for domestic and export products and incorporating that cost in their
prices, those products are becoming less competitive. U.S. companies
are, in effect, exporting high levels of product accountability to countries
that do not want or cannot afford it: "It handicaps U.S. firms as they
compete against those of other nations - which do not carry similarly
expensive liabilities. The [United States] can't make its competitors as-
sume these liabilities, and the result will be further loss of overseas
markets."15
In contrast, product liability insurance rates set for foreign machines
coming into the United States reflect the difficulty of bringing suit and
enforcing a judgment against the foreign manufacturer. During an inter-
view, an U.S. insurer stated that, unless the foreign manufacturer has an
American operation, his experience indicates that pursuing the foreign
manufacturer in a product liability suit would be fruitless. This assump-
tion is taken into account in the underwriting considerations regarding a
U.S. manufacturer who uses imported components.
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California,16 the
U.S. Supreme Court split on the issue of whether or not the awareness on
the part of a foreign defendant that the components it manufactured,
sold and delivered outside the United States would reach California in
the stream of commerce constitutes sufficient minimum contacts between
the defendant and California to support the exercise of jurisdiction, but
13 Corrigan v. Shiley Corp., 182 Cal. App. 3d 166 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 921 J1987).
14 Corrigan, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 166. See also Holmes v. Syntex Laboratories, 156 Cal. App.
3d 372 (1984).
15 Besharov, Tort Laws Hobble U.S. Business Abroad, Wall Street J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 22.
16 Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
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agreed that exercise of jurisdiction under the circumstances was unrea-
sonable. A Japanese manufacturer, Asahi, sold and delivered 1,350,000
tire valve assemblies over 5 years to Cheng Shin, a Taiwan manufacturer,
for use as components in finished tires, 18% of which were sold in Cali-
fornia. Cheng Shin settled the product liability claim (tire blowout)
against it and pursued an indemnity claim against Asahi, which moved
to quash the service of summons on the basis that the fourteenth amend-
ment prohibited California from exercising jurisdiction. The majority of
the Court agreed that exercise of jurisdiction was unreasonable and did
not comply with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,"
but only four Justices agreed that there were insufficient minimum con-
tacts. The holding of unreasonableness was based on the substantial bur-
den upon Asahi to travel to California and the defend itself in a foreign
legal system, and that the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in as-
serting jurisdiction are slight in an indemnification claim between two
foreign parties regarding a transaction which took place in Taiwan. It
was not demonstrated to be more convenient to litigate in California
rather than Taiwan or Japan; California's legitimate interests were con-
siderably diminished where neither party was a California resident, and
the claim was about indemnification, rather than safety standards; and it
was not clear that California law should govern the question. The Court
was not convinced that allowing California jurisdiction would create an
additional deterrent to the manufacture of unsafe components.
While the unique facts of the Asahi case may limit its usefulness as
precedent, it emphasizes the importance of reasonableness and provides a
helpful discussion of relevant considerations in determining reasonable-
ness in the exercise of personal jurisdiction. While Asahi narrows U.S.
court jurisdiction over foreign defendants, it leaves a blur instead of a
distinct line for defining the boundaries of personal jurisdiction under a
minimum contacts analysis. The opinions of five of the Justices indicate
a broader application of personal jurisdiction may arise when they next
address this issue. It is interesting to note that the California Manufac-
turers' Association filed an amicus curiae brief supporting California ju-
risdiction because so many California manufacturers purchase foreign
made components.17
Even if the jurisdictional difficulty can be overcome, service of pro-
cess and discovery are complicated by international conventions requir-
ing translation of the pleadings into the foreign language and compliance
with the procedural rules and public policy of the foreign jurisdiction.
For example, the California based tire seller, co-defendant of Cheng Shin
in the Asahi case, had decided not to pursue a separate case against Asahi
because it was unwilling to underwrite the roughly $5,000 in translation
and other expenses required to serve a foreign company under interna-
17 See Steward, Shortening California's Long Arm, 73 A.B.A.J. 45, 49 (1987).
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tional procedures."8 This difficulty may be alleviated somewhat by the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Society National Industrielle Aerospatiale
v. United States District Court,19 which* held that the Hague Evidence
Convention ("the Convention") does not provide exclusive or mandatory
procedures for discovery in foreign countries, and that international
comity does not require in all instances that American litigants resort to
the Convention procedures before initiating discovery under the Federal
Rules. While the foreign defendants had submitted to the U.S. court's
jurisdiction and had engaged in initial discovery in the United States,
they asked for a protective order against discovery in France under the
U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court found that the French
"blocking statute," prohibiting such discovery was not sufficient to de-
prive an American court of the power to order a party subject to its
jurisdiction to produce evidence.20 The Court directed the forum court
to apply "a more particularized analysis of the respective interests of the
foreign nation and the requesting nation."21 The domestic court is to
weigh the reasonableness of the discovery request, the interests of the
foreign country, and the likelihood that the Convention procedures
would prove effective. The four dissenting Justices concluded that the
comity analysis is pre-empted by the existence of the Convention which
was designed to eliminate the controversy that had arisen over the at-
tempted application of U.S. discovery rules in other countries. Domestic
courts and private litigants are not well positioned to evaluate the con-
flicting interests of the forum court and sovereign interests of the foreign
country. Even with the weight of this recent authority, it remains ques-
tionable as to what sanctions the U.S. court would impose if the French
company and French courts refused to cooperate. Even if a judgment is
entered against the French company, hostile French courts may not al-
low it to be enforced in France.
Unless the foreign manufacturer has assets in the United States that
can be identified by the plaintiff, a successful plaintiff will be faced with
the difficulty of enforcing the judgment in the foreign country. At best it
is difficult, and often impossible, to execute that judgment against the
assets of the foreign manufacturer in its own country. Britain has re-
sisted efforts of the United States to negotiate an enforcement of judg-
18 Id.
19 Society National Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 107 S. Ct. 2542
(1987).
20 Apparently, France had indicated it would not execute letters of request for pretrial discov-
ery of documents, and the defendants were subject to fines if they complied with the plaintiff's
discovery under the Federal Rules. The U.S. plaintiffs would not have been able to discover the
subject documents if they were forced to proceed under the Convention. Blocking statutes have been
enacted by civil law countries as a counter measure to U.S. discovery which is much more broad
than their procedures. See Guzman, The Interplay Between the Discovery Provisions of the Hague
Evidence Convention and The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 9 HousTON J. INT'L L. 33, 340 n. 34
(1987).
21 Society National Industrielle Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2555.
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ments treaty in order to avoid what it considers to be excessive product
liability awards. The successful plaintiff will then have only the hope
that he will somehow be able to identify assets of the defendant that may
enter the United States in the future, a difficult prospect at best.
With these handicaps and the great expense in time and money that
a plaintiff's attorney would have to incur in order to proceed against a
foreign manufacturer, it is highly unlikely that a weak suit or a case with
questionable or low damages would be initiated. Therefore, the foreign
manufacturers will only face product liability actions where the case for
liability is strong and the potential damages are substantial. Even in
those cases, the uncertainty and delay greatly reduce the settlement value
of the lawsuit.22 Our interviews revealed that a great number of the
product liability suits brought against U.S. manufacturers are considered
by them to be tenuous at best and many are clearly frivolous. Neverthe-
less, these actions still involve a great deal of expense for the manufac-
turer to extricate the company from the proceeding. For example, a
number of manufacturers interviewed described suits against them for
injuries caused by machines that they had not manufactured. One com-
pany explained that it cost $13,000 in one case and $18,000 in another to
obtain summary judgment and dismissal from such a suit. If U.S. plain-
tiffs faced the same procedural difficulties in pursuing domestic manufac-
turers that are involved in cases against foreign manufacturers, there
would be a substantial reduction of product liability actions brought
against U.S. manufacturers and, therefore, reduced insurance costs and
other overhead. Unfortunately, the current U.S. system confers an ad-
vantage upon foreign manufacturers which makes them less accountable
than U.S. manufacturers to persons injured by their products, which re-
sults in unprotected American users of the foreign products, lower insur-
ance costs to be included in the prices of the foreign products and loss of
market share for U.S. manufacturers.23
V. IMPACT ON PRODUCT REMOVAL AND DEVELOPMENT
A hidden cost of our product liability system arises in the form of
stifled product development, innovation, experimentation, and manufac-
ture of new and existing products. Inventors, developers, manufacturers
and marketers have extreme fears of being sued over new products and
technologies as well as existing product lines. In a 1986 survey of process
equipment manufacturers, 19% of the respondents reported that they
had dropped some existing product lines because the product liability
risks were too high, and 16% reported that they had considered develop-
ing a new product, but decided against development due to product lia-
bility concerns. A survey conducted by Egon Zehnder International
found that 57% of the top managers surveyed agreed that state-of-the-art
22 Supra note 10.
23 Cf. supra note 10, at 30-31.
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products that would help the United States regain its competitive footing
are not going forward for fear of product liability suits.24 Sixty-two per-
cent believed innovation and experimentation have been constrained in
recent years for fear of liability. "Given a choice, it seems that many
manufacturers have chosen to stay with a proven, even mediocre prod-
uct, rather than take a chance on developing something new or more
advanced, and potentially more competitive. ' 25 Researchers fear that
new types of liability will emerge and some of the state-of-the-art applica-
tions are not going forward, such as computers with artificial intelli-
gence.26 Other examples include: Harvard Medical School professors
abandoned development of a new drug that would help thousands of pa-
tients who suffer blindness and facial spasms; plans to market a new pro-
cess that would speed up natural decomposition of chemical wastes were
dropped; driving aids for the handicapped were removed from the mar-
ket; the manufacture of anesthesia gas machines was discontinued; sport-
ing goods manufacturers ceased doing business, discontinued products or
did not introduce other products; child car seat manufacturers decreased
from twelve to nine.27 Avco Lycoming Textron dropped a five year $30
million project to develop a turbo-charged rotary engine for general avia-
tion because it would face the prospect of even higher product liability
rates from insurers who are fearful of a new technology.
In the textile machinery industry, product liability has taken its toll,
forcing companies to drop lines or to go out of business. After 100 years
of manufacturing rotary textile machines, Proctor & Schwartz, Inc.
dropped its entire line of rotary textile machinery due to economic fac-
tors, including mounting costs (direct or indirect) of product liability.
"Since that time, they [have] continued to be faced with the ever-increas-
ing costs of defending lawsuits, some of which arise out of accidents in-
volving machines that are seventy years old and others involving cases
where the accident occurred on machines that were not manufactured by
Proctor. '28 The theory of risk spreading as a philosophic basis for strict
liability does not work for companies like Proctor because the cost of
product liability cannot be passed on to consumers of the product when
the product is no longer being manufactured by the company. The
James Hunter Machine Company, Inc. ended its 136 years of manufac-
turing textile machinery by filing Chapter 11 bankruptcy, "not so much
because business conditions are poor, but because of a little understood,
yet all too familiar concern of American manufacturers - product liabil-
ity."2 9 Davis and Furber Machine Company began manufacturing tex-
tile machinery in the U.S. in 1830 and went out of business in 1982.
24 II Corporate Issues Monitor 1 (3rd Qtr. 1987).
25 Id. at 2.
26 Schwartz, Product Liability, A Crisis Well With Us, ACROSS THE BOARD 16 (Oct. 1987).
27 Id. See also, Oberlink, The Product Liability Monster, ADWEEK 16 (November 3, 1986).
28 129 CONG. REc. E2897 (daily ed. June 14, 1983).
29 Id.
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"The annual cost of product liability made manufacturing new textile
machinery impossible.... At one point Davis and Furber was one of the
largest textile machinery manufacturers in the world. It no longer ex-
ists." '30 U.S. textile manufacturers still need the rotary textile machine
that these three former competitors had supplied in order to continue to
manufacture U.S. made textiles. The lion's share of the U.S. market for
these machines is now controlled by foreign competitors.
Through the suspicious-looking glass of our product liability law,
attorneys too often see the risks rather than the benefits. They advise
their clients that the new development may be too risky, too new, with no
precedent to follow in a broad area of technology. Their fear is that it
may build in a liability of which no one is aware. This thinking leads to a
status quoism that prefers staying with a proven product rather than tak-
ing a chance with something new, more advanced and more competitive.
Adoption of a new, safer technology implicitly involves acknowledgment
that the previous technology was not as safe as possible. There is a per-
ception that it is safer to stay with an established product than risk law-
suits with an unknown product which may also stimulate lawsuits with
respect to established product lines.
Domestic manufacturers are removing highly vulnerable, but so-
cially and economically necessary industrial products from the U.S. mar-
ket, leaving the arena to their foreign competitors to fill. This reduction
in competition may lead to higher prices for the foreign machines and
potential disruption in production of, and the competitiveness of, the
U.S. purchaser of the foreign machine who may be left subject to the
whims of foreign suppliers. The reluctance to develop and introduce new
products will lead to further erosion of the U.S. competitive edge in tech-
nology. This trend undercuts our national policy of encouraging domes-
tic manufacturers to develop high quality and technologically superior
products in order to become more competitive in domestic and interna-
tional markets.
VI. PERSPECTIVE OF FOREIGN MANUFACTURERS
Foreign manufacturers and insurers are generally appalled by the
increasing impact on their operations of the American product liability
explosion and are even offended by liability actions against them in the
United States which they view as the imposition of our socioeconomic
values upon them. They are further confused by the vagueness of our
product liability laws and their variance in the fifty different States.
Many are especially appalled by punitive damages, which they consider
penal in nature and only to be imposed in the form of fines and other
sanctions, not as rewards to private litigants. They believe that compen-
sation should vary not according to degree of fault but according to de-
gree of injury and loss.
30 Id.
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Some Europeans have suggested that the U.S. product liability sys-
tem amounts to a nontariff trade barrier. They have asserted that the
high cost of product liability insurance and the threat of outrageous jury
awards discourage some European competitors from entering the U.S.
market. When the product liability insurance capacity in Europe began
to shrink in the mid-1980s, it became more difficult for foreign firms (es-
pecially in France) to acquire coverage for U.S. exports. Thus, some
firms decided to proceed with sales in the United States without product
liability insurance on the theory of "catch me if you can." Indeed, dur-
ing our study, we were informed that sixty to seventy percent of French
companies do not insure for product liability. This, of course, gives them
an additional competitive advantage. It is particularly difficult for a
small company with a small potential sales volume to justify the cost
necessary to insure its sales against product liability in the U.S. market.
In fact, the U.S. product liability system is not a trade barrier because
U.S. firms, which are competing against the foreign manufacturers, are
incurring even higher product liability costs for the reasons explained
above.
The U.S. product liability system has had effects on international
trade beyond competition in the sale of products. Some foreign investors
have decided not to acquire U.S. companies because of the long tail of
product liability exposure that comes with successor liability in the
United States. Some foreign manufacturers that considered opening a
plant in the United States have decided against it. An example was cited
of one company that had actually closed several plants in the United
States in order to escape further exposure to U.S. product liability laws.
This, of course, has a negative impact on the U.S. economy because of a
loss of jobs from the closing of the plants and the loss of potential jobs
that could have been created by the opening of other plants. Such deci-
sions are being made on the basis of actual knowledge of exposure or due
to the inability to predict or have any certainty as to the potential
exposure.
VII. THE NEED FOR PASSAGE OF FEDERAL PRODUCT LIABILITY
REFORM LEGISLATION: H.R. 1115
While manufacturers should develop risk prevention measures in or-
der to ameliorate product liability problems, it cannot be ignored that the
single most effective measure for reducing product liability costs would
be the enactment of federal legislation such as H.R. 1115, the Uniform
Product Safety Act of 1987. The Federal Interagency Task Force on
Product Liability concluded that a major cause of the product liability
problem is the uncertainty in the tort litigation system.3" This conclu-
sion was confirmed by our interviews with manufacturers and insurers in
31 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL
REPORT at 1-20, 1-26 (May 1977).
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Europe and the United States. The patchwork nature of U.S. product
liability law and the attendant unpredictability of responsibility has re-
sulted in higher than necessary insurance costs. The varying product
liability legal standards in the fifty different States and the District of
Columbia must be replaced by national standards to be applied uni-
formly by the courts throughout the country.
It is very difficult for manufacturers and insurers to plan for the
amount of insurance needed or to predict the theory of recovery likely to
be used since product liability laws differ significantly from State to State.
These laws determine the probability and the size of the losses involved.
Also of significance are the various statutes of limitations among the
States, the various defenses available, and the differing forms of damages.
Insurers are more hesitant to become involved in products liability risks
because of these factors and also because of a trend toward greater liabil-
ity and increased compensation.
Manufacturers of durable products, such as machines, present par-
ticular problems for their insurers who must set current premiums for
machines that may be outdated, yet still in use. Liability for machines
that often cannot even be located exacerbates the difficulties involved in
estimating further losses. These indefinite liabilities gave rise to severe
premium increases for capital goods manufacturers. "In 1976, these un-
certainties contributed to liability premium increases of over one thou-
sand percent. . . . To the extent there is a crisis in products liability
insurance, it has been caused more by increases in claims costs."32 These
uncertainties contributed to increased premiums in the mid-1970s among
the subject industries by 500% to 5000% and the 500% to 1500% in-
creases in premiums in the 1983-86 period.
Section 203 of H.R. 1115 establishes a strict liability standard for
manufacturers in product liability cases, with some important
limitations:
Where there was no practical or feasible alternative design of a
product, the manufacturer will not be liable unless the product is egre-
giously unsafe, the user cannot reasonably be expected to know of its
risks, and it has little or no usefulness.
Where the manufacturer did not and could not have known of a
defect at the time the product left his control, he is not liable. If the
manufacturer has reason to learn about the defect later, he must take
reasonable steps to warn those who might be harmed.
Section 209 of H.R. 1115 would reduce the inequity that arises out
of the interaction between the worker's compensation and product liabil-
ity systems in the United States. While the employer may retain the
worker's compensation shield to any further liability to the employee for
its negligence, subrogation would be eliminated and the amount of
32 Note, Limiting Liability: Products Liability and a Statute of Repose, 32 BAYLOR L. REv.
137, 142 (1980).
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worker's compensation that the plaintiff will receive would be deducted
from any amount that a court determines the manufacturer must pay.
This reduction does not affect the amount the plaintiff currently receives,
but rather takes the place of the employer's subrogation lien which cur-
rently is being deducted from the recovery of the plaintiff. An Alliance
of American Insurer's survey found that worker's compensation subroga-
tion was involved in 68.5% of job-related accidents. This provision will
reduce transaction costs attendant to subrogation and place an incentive
on the employer who is in the best position to assure safety and prevent
injuries in the workplace. This is consistent with the injury prevention
policy of product liability law.
In the case of capital goods, a statute of repose of twenty-five years
after delivery to the first buyer or lessee is set forth in section 207(b) of
H.R. 1115. While a shorter time period consistent with the useful safe
life of a machine would be preferable, the twenty-five year period will be
helpful with respect to long tail liability created by over-aged machines.
The International Study reveals that of the 55 companies responding to
our questionnaire, 11.8% have been producing machinery for over 100
years and that the companies responding had been producing machinery
for an average of 47 years. As discussed hereinabove, these over-aged
machines create a great deal of litigation and contribute heavily to insur-
ance costs even though the manufacturer has no control over these ma-
chines and usually has no knowledge that they remain in existence.
Furthermore, any defects caused by the manufacturer and any injuries
caused by the machine would be discovered much earlier than twenty-
five years from the date of manufacture.
Punitive damage reform is provided in section 206. To the extent
permitted under state law, punitive damages may be awarded if the
claimant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the manufac-
turer or product seller engaged in punitive conduct. Failure to exercise
reasonable care in selecting among alternative designs is not, by itself,
conduct which may give rise to punitive damages. Section 206 permits
bifurcation of a trial to determine separately liability and the amount of
punitive damages that may be awarded.
By specifying criteria for determining responsibility and limitations
on responsibility, federal product liability legislation would reduce uncer-
tainty and ambiguity in the U.S. product liability system. The predict-
ability of manufacturer's and seller's responsibilities will result in
lowered product liability insurance premiums. Predictability will also as-
sist in dealing with the problem of successor liability and the continua-
tion of businesses that are failing as a result of product liability burdens.
The elimination of subrogation will increase the incentive of employers to
maintain a safe workplace. This would bring our product liability system
closer to the European approach to the workplace problem where an in-
centive and responsibility is placed upon the employer as the party best
able to create safety and prevent injuries in the workplace. The transac-
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tion costs involved in the pursuit of subrogation would also be elimi-
nated. A reduction in transaction costs would also result because
meritorious suits will be settled more quickly due to the certainty of legal
standards applicable to the case. While the plaintiff's rights are main-
tained, manufacturers will benefit through lower insurance and transac-
tion costs as well as the ability to predict their responsibility and act
accordingly in producing a safer product. Consumers and buyers of
products will benefit as lower product liability costs will be passed on in
the form of lower prices for products. The anticompetitive conditions
caused by product liability fears, which have chilled innovation and
product development, will be reduced. U.S. manufacturers will become
more technologically and price competitive in both domestic and interna-
tional markets.
While not included in H.R. 1115, Congress should consider the leg-
islative recommendations of Douglas Besharov: when foreign cases are
tried in the United States, require that the procedural as well as the sub-
stantive law of the foreign country where the injury occurred be applied,
limit discovery, damages and contingency fees to the same degree as they
are available in that foreign country; enact a more far-reaching long-arm
statute, giving U.S. courts jurisdiction over firms producing goods likely
to reach this country or require such a manufacturer to consent to being
sued here; and require goods entering this country to provide proof of
sufficient funds in the United States or a certificate of insurance to cover
probable injuries.3 3 While these suggestions have not been well received
on Capital Hill at this time, they may be appropriate additions to a trade
bill in the next Congress.
There is an immediate need for federal reform of U.S. product liabil-
ity laws, both substantive and procedural. While it is not politically fea-
sible to change the U.S. system to the extent necessary to conform it to
the other systems in the rest of the world, the modest reforms currently
pending in Congress can help. We must work towards decreasing the
product liability cost advantages enjoyed by foreign competitors and cre-
ate a federal U.S. law that is less hostile to advanced technological
development.
33 Supra note 10, at 31.
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